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Deweyan Democracy, Robert Talisse, and the Fact of Reasonable 
Pluralism: A Rawlsian Response 
Joshua Forstenzer, University of Sheffield 
Abstract 
Over the last decade, Robert Talisse has developed a devastating argument against 
reviving John ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝĚĞĂů ? /Ŷ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ?A Pragmatist Philosophy of 
Democracy, and in other essays, Talisse has argued that Deweyan democracy fails to 
ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞ ZĂǁůƐ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ŽĨ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ
committed to a perfectionist conception of the good. In response, this article offers a 
ZĂǁůƐŝĂŶƌĞďƵƚƚĂůƚŽdĂůŝƐƐĞďǇĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶZĂǁůƐ ?ŽǁŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽf perfectionism 
to show that ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ ŝƐŶŽƚƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽŶZĂǁůƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶĚ
thus can reasonably accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism. This article thus 
begins by exposing ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ďĞĨŽƌĞ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ Shane 
ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞƌůŝŶŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ ZĂǁůƐŝĂŶ ĨŝůƚĞƌƐƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ?Ɛ
argument. Then, it develops its central argument by showing that, even if we accept the 
Rawlsian filter, Deweyan democracy does not fail to accommodate the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, because it only relies on a thin (not a full) theory of the good, 
before considering some foreseeable Talissean objections. Ultimately, the article 
concludes by showing that these objections fail because Deweyan democracy does not 
ƌĞůǇŽŶĂ ‘ĨƵůů ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ ? 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, Robert Talisse has developed a devastating argument against John 
ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝĚĞĂů ? /Ŷdeed, most explicitly in his book, A Pragmatist Philosophy 
of Democracy,1 and in his essays,2 dĂůŝƐƐĞŚĂƐĚƌĂǁŶŽŶ:ŽŚŶZĂǁůƐ ?Political Liberalism 
to articulate a crushing objection to the project of reviving ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
democracy. 3  Talisse contends that Deweyan democracy has one fundamental 
shortcoming: namely, it fails to accommodate what Rawls calls  “ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
plurĂůŝƐŵ ? ?  
In this article, I will offer a Rawlsian defencĞ ŽĨ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝĚĞĂů ďǇ
drawing on Rawls ? broader conceptual apparatus with a special focus on his conception 
ŽĨ  ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? ?However, before I go any further, I must state that despite serious 
ŵŝƐŐŝǀŝŶŐƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŵĞĞƚŝŶŐZĂǁůƐ ?ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶĨŽƌůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ
a non-circular manner,4 ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽdĂůŝƐƐĞ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞ
most comprehensive and charitable manner, I will assume throughout this article that 
the fact of reasonable pluralism can, at least in principle, be accommodated. Moreover, 
for the sake of clarity, it must be understood that for present purposes the terms 
 ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽŽĚ ? ?  ‘ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽŽĚ ? ? ĂŶĚ‘ĐŽ ĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶŐ ?
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will be taken to be broadly synonymous. Furthermore, I will ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǁĞǇĂŶ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?as ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝĚĞĂl as interpreted largely by the lights of his 
Middle and Later Works. ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĞĂƌůǇ articulation of his democratic ideal and those 
developed by some commentators who stress this early period are fairly obviously 
perfectionistic and thus reasonably rejectable.5 To be clear, while there is undoubtedly 
continuity iŶ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? / ĨŽůůŽǁGregory Pappas in 
understanding there to have been significant changes ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĞĂƌůǇ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ
 ‘ŵĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĞƚŚŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ.6 As a result, part of the task I am setting for myself here consists 
ŝŶĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ mature democratic ideal, fully reflecting the 
ƐŚŝĨƚĨƌŽŵ ‘ĂďƐŽůƵƚŝƐŵƚŽĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ ?ŝŶĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛoverall philosophical project.7 
Now, wŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ŵŝŶĚ ? / ǁŝůů ƐŚŽǁ ƚŚĂƚ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨĂŝůƐ ŽŶ Zawlsian 
terms, since Dewey ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝĚĞĂůproperly understood does not rely on what Rawls 
called a  ‘ĨƵůů ?ďƵƚĂ ‘ƚŚŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĨƵůůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚZĂǁůƐ ?
characterisation of the fact of reasonable pluralism. To show this, I will start by 
thoroughly ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐdĂůŝƐƐĞ ?ƐĐĂƐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞǁĞǇĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?/ ? ?ƚŚĞŶ/ǁŝůůƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ
^ŚĂŶĞ ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ Ğ ĨĂŝůƐ ƚŽ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞ ĞǁĞǇĂŶ
democracy in its own terms (II); subsequently, I will articulate my Rawlsian defence of 
Deweyan democracy against Talisse ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ (III); I will consider and reject some 
likely responses from Talisse (IV); and ultimately, I will show that Deweyan democracy is 
not ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƌĞũĞĐƚĂďůĞŝŶZĂǁůƐŝĂŶƚĞƌŵƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞůǇŽŶĂ ‘ĨƵůů ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ
the good. 
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/ ?dĂůŝƐƐĞ ?ƐĂƐĞŐĂŝŶƐƚĞǁĞǇĂŶĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ 
In order to construct his case against Dewey, Talisse ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐ  “ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ĨŽƵƌ
interlocking theses as constituƚŝǀĞŽĨĞǁĞǇĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? P
(1) The Continuity Thesis: The democratic political order is a moral order 
characterized by a distinctive conception of human flourishing. 
  
(2) The Transformative Thesis: The democratic process is one in which individual 
preferences, attitudes and opinions are informed and transformed rather than 
simply aggregated. 
 
(3) The Way of Life Thesis: Democracy is not simply a kind of state or a mode of 
government, but a way of life. 
 
(4) The Perfectionist Thesis: Democratic states may enact legislation and design 
institutions for the expressed purpose of fostering the values and attitudes 
necessary for human flourishing.8  
 
/ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ 
compound effect of (1) and (4). Why? Taken together, they lend authority to the notion 
that the state is entitled to use its power to further a distinctive conception of human 
flourishing. This is problematic for Talisse. According to him, since we live under 
conditions of reasonable pluralism, we cannot expect all reasonable citizens to agree 
upon one conception of the good, hence justifying state action with reference to this 
controversial conception of the good would result in oppressing dissident citizens. 
Talisse is, of course, here borrowing from Rawls ? characterisation of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, which is in need of further explanation.  
 
Rawls and the Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
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ZĂǁůƐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐes  “ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚƵƐ P 
There is no single comprehensive philosophical, religious or moral doctrine upon 
which reason converges. That is to say, there is a set of defensible and 
reasonable comprehensive moral ideals such that each ideal is fully consistent 
with the best exercise of reason but inconsistent with other members of the 
set.9  
  
/Ŷ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ ZĂǁůƐ ĐĂůůƐ  ‘ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƐ ?  ?ŝ ?Ğ ?
religious or philosophical views about the order of the world or sources of normativity) 
cannot be explained by mere misinformation, stubbornness, irrationality, or malice.10 Or 
ĂƐ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ƉƵƚƐ ŝƚ ?  “ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ  W sincere, honest, and intelligent individuals 
carefully attending to the relevant considerations and doing their epistemic best  W 
nonetheless disagrĞĞĂƚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨŝŐYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?11 Talisse therefore follows Rawls in 
claiming that we have no other choice but to accept that these disagreements are the 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŽĨ  “ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƵŶĚĞƌĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ĨƌĞĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?12 
Thus, since reasonable people disagree about the fundamental values that ought to 
guide the state, the state cannot justify the promotion of any one fundamental value to 
all reasonable members of society. For Rawls, the fact of reasonable pluralism entails 
that the only legitimate ideal for settling debates about constitutional arrangements and 
matters of basic justice is a political conception of justice which can be the object of an 
overlapping consensus among all reasonable citizens. 
According to Rawls, in order for this political conception of justice to be the 
object of an overlapping consensus, it must be modular, freestanding from  W or as 
^ĂŵƵĞů&ƌĞĞŵĂŶƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? “ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽĨ ?13  W comprehensive doctrines. Since a political 
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conception of justice needs to be acceptable (or at least not objectionable) to people 
holding any reasonable comprehensive doctrine, it must not ultimately depend on any 
one of those doctrines for its justification. Instead, it must find grounds for its 
justification in the shared public political culture of the society from which it emerges. 
Rawls writes: 
Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, 
held in common; and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the 
public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political 
conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment.14  
 
If a given conception of justice  W call it (j)  W is grounded in views found outside the public 
political culture, then (j) is not a political conception of justice, because it is reasonably 
rejectable. To put it otherwise, reasonable citizens can object to living under a state 
which is dedicated to promoting (j). Thus, on the Rawlsian account, the state ought to 
remain neutral with regard to competing comprehensive doctrines (say, (j), (k), (l), etc.), 
however reasonable these may be. On this view, if the state is not neutral with regard to 
comprehensive doctrines, it is ipso facto oppressive. Accordingly, to avoid state 
oppression, no comprehensive doctrine is permitted to play a uniquely determining role 
in shaping the conception of justice that will justify the operations of the state. Only a 
political conception of justice, which remains neutral with regard to reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, can legitimately justify state action. A political conception of 
justice is composed of the views found at the intersection of all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine, but is not composed of the views associated with reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that reasonable citizens might reasonably reject. If even one 
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reasonable member of society has reason to object to a part of (j), then that part of (j) is 
not a part of the overlapping parts of (j), (k), (l), etc.; that is to say, that part of (j) is not a 
part of a political conception of justice, and it thus cannot justify the use of state power 
without being oppressive.  
 
The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism and Deweyan Democracy 
Crucially, Talisse believes Deweyan democracy to be a comprehensive doctrine and not 
a political conception of justice. Why? Talisse contends that Deweyan democracy is a 
comprehensive doctrine with the ambition of using the state apparatus to realise its 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽŽĚ ? dĂůŝƐƐĞ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “dŚĞ ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ǀŝĞǁ is driven by a 
distinctive conception of human flourishing according to which the participation of 
citizens in democratic community is both the necessary condition for and essential 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚŽĨĂƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞ ? ?15 ,ĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ? “ƚŚĞĞǁĞǇĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂt seeks to 
reconstruct the whole of society in the image of her own philosophical commitments, 
she seeks to coerce people to live under political institutions that are explicitly designed 
to cultivate norms and realize civic ideals that they could reasonabůǇ ƌĞũĞĐƚ ? ?16 
Furthermore, to explain by way of analogy why this is problematic, Talisse offers the 
example of Joe the utilitarian: 
:ŽĞƚŚŝŶŬƐǁŝƚŚDŝůůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ,ĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?',W ?ŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ
ĂƉƉĞĂůŽŶĂůůĞƚŚŝĐĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?17 Consequently, he thinks that any question of 
public policy or institutional design is decisively answered by the GHP. Suppose 
Joe also thinks, again with Mill, that a system of weighted voting, in which 
 ‘ŐƌĂĚƵĂƚĞƐ ŽĨ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ĂƌĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ  ‘ƚǁŽ Žƌ ŵŽƌĞ ǀŽƚĞƐ ?18, best satisfies the 
GHP. Further stipulate that Joe is correct that weighted voting is required by the 
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GHP. The fact of reasonable pluralism is the fact that utilitarianism is not the 
only reasonable moral doctrine that free citizens might adopt; one may reject 
ƵƚŝůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞďǇƌĞǀŽŬŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐĨŝƚŶĞƐƐĨŽƌĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ?
In order to be legitimate, public policy must be justifiable to all citizens, even 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ŽƉƉŽƐĞ ƵƚŝůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ĂƐ Ă ŵŽƌĂů ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? :ŽĞ ?Ɛ
utilitarian reasons could be reasonably rejected; they are hence insufficient to 
publicly justify weighted voting.19  
 
Thus, Talisse contends that the Deweyan democrat is in a position analogous to Joe the 
utilitarian, because her conception of human flourishing (or  ‘growth ? ?ďƵƚŵŽƌĞŽŶ that 
soon) ŝƐ ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ',W P ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ƚĂŬĞ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ  “ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ
appeal on all ethical questions. ? 
To be clear, it is not so much that Talisse believes Deweyan democrats to be 
closet tyrants wanting to curtail the political rights of individuals; it is rather that Talisse 
believes Deweyan democrats to be discursive tyrants, since they hold that fostering 
growth is the one true goal of genuine democracy and they require, according to Talisse, 
that others agree to this goal as a precondition for engaging in democratic discussions. 
Talisse further specifies that, even if the Deweyan view of democracy were true, it 
would still be illegitimate to appeal to it in public deliberation, because other reasonable 
members of society can reject that view. Indeed, on the Rawlsian account, the truth of a 
moral doctrine is independent of its capacity to be the object of an overlapping 
consensus serving as the basis for public justification. Talisse explains:  
The Rawlsian insight is that in order to be legitimate, public policy must be 
justifiable by reasons that meet a standard higher than truth; publicly justifying 
reasons must be not reasonably rejectable. The fact of reasonable pluralism 
means that no comprehensive doctrine is beyond reasonable rejection; 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ :ŽĞ ?Ɛ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚĞƌŝǀĞ ĨƌŽŵĂ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚensive 
doctrine  W again, even a reasonable one  W cannot publicly justify. In order to 
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publicly justify weighted voting in a democratic society, Joe must appeal to 
reasons that even non-utilitarians could accept.20 
 
In other words, Talisse contends that DeweǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĂŶ
appropriate social ideal because people can legitimately reject some of its core 
philosophical commitments (that is, its conception of the good) without being said to be 
 ‘ƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ? Žƌ  ‘failing at democracy ?. According to him, although Deweyan 
democracy is reasonable, it demands of other participants in democratic deliberation 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ ĐĂŶ ƐĞƌǀĞ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ĨŽƌ
political justification. This, in turn, is unacceptable to Talisse, since the fact of reasonable 
pluralism entails that reasonable people disagree about what is the ultimate goal of 
moral action. Talisse thus concludes that Deweyan democracy is reasonably rejectable 
and oppressive.21  
 As I made clear at the outset of this article, it is precisely this contention that I 
intend to dispute. A number of responses to Talisse focus on demonstrating that his 
alternative Peircean conception of democracy fares no better than Deweyan democracy 
in accommodating the fact of reasonable pluralism.22  While those criticisms may have 
their merits, I intend to defend Deweyan democracy by ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ŽŶZĂǁůƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ
of perfectionist conceptions of the good, the conception of the good held by Deweyan 
democrats (growth) is not perfectionist. However, in order to provide more context 
before offering a substantive argument to that effect I will rehearse ^ŚĂŶĞ ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨĞǁĞǇĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚdĂůŝƐƐĞ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĨĂŝůƐƚŽ
evaluate Deweyan democracy by its own standard of pluralism. 
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// ?&ŝůƚĞƌŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞ&ŝůƚĞƌƐ ?ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?ƐZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽdĂůŝƐƐĞ 
In  ‘ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ĂŶĚ WůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ P  ZĞƵŶŝŽŶ ? ? ^ŚĂŶĞ ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ dĂůŝƐƐĞ
fails to treat Deweyan democracy on its own terms. 23 Ralston argues that Talisse 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƐ ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ĨŝůƚĞƌƐ P/ƐĂŝĂŚ ĞƌůŝŶ ?Ɛ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ǀĂůƵĞ
ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ?:ŽŚŶZĂǁůƐ ?ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůĂŶĚ
substantive conceptions of democracy. While Talisse eventually abandons both the 
procedural/substantive dichotomy and the use of Berlinian value pluralism to articulate 
his criticism of Deweyan democracy,24 I think we can ignore the former but not the 
ůĂƚƚĞƌ ŝŶ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞƉůǇ ƚŽ dĂůŝƐƐĞ ? That is why I will address ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ
characterisation of the Berlinian and then the Rawlsian filter. 
 
The Lens of Berlinian Value Pluralism 
According to ĞƌůŝŶ ? “ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƐĞůĞĐƚƚŚĞŝƌǀĂůƵĞƐĨƌŽŵĂŵŽŶŐĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?25 This means that, on this view, human ends are incommensurable and 
potentially mutually exclusive. Berlin concludes from this that any attempt at 
harmonisŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŐŽŽĚƐŝƐĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ P “/ŶƚƌĂĐƚĂďůĞǀĂůƵĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶƵŶĂƐƐĂŝůĂďůĞĨĂĐƚŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŵŽƌĂů ůŝĨĞ ? ?26 This view presupposes that values 
pre-exist the process of moral inquiry and that the process of moral inquiry merely 
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŝŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƌĂŶŬŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐ “ĂĐĂƚĂůŽŐƵĞŽƌŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐĐŚĞŵĂ
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ŽĨĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?27 Ralston points out that, on the Deweyan account of valuation, the 
ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŝƐĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ P “ůŽŐŝĐŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽ ŶƚŽůŽŐǇ ?^ŝŶĐĞůŽŐŝĐŝƐĂƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ
inquiry, any shared values must first undergo collective investigation and 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŝŶŐƐĞƚƚůĞĚ ‘ŽǀĞƌĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞďŽĂƌĚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŽĨ
ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? ?28 In other words, for Dewey, the process of inquiry is existentially prior 
to any ontological claim about the existence of values or about their incommensurability 
and incompatibility. This means that it is not so much the case that Dewey is committed 
to the notion that all values will definitely be rendered fully harmonious; it is rather the 
case that he is committed to the idea that we must pursue such harmony to the extent 
that we can achieve it through the process of inquiry. Ralston concludes from this that 
 “ĞǁĞǇĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ ?ŽƌƵŶŝƚĂƌǇƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ
values, but rather a way, among many others, to reconcile different and often-times 
conflicting value orientatioŶƐ ŝŶƚŽ Ă  ‘ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝǀĞ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ? ?29 This entails two 
things: (i) Deweyan democracy does not offer a final picture of the moral world towards 
which we ought to strive; and (ii) Deweyan democracy is a method for negotiating 
conflicts of value that emerge from within the flow of human life.  
 
The Lens of Rawlsian Reasonable Pluralism 
Ralston then ƚƵƌŶƐƚŽdĂůŝƐƐĞ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨZĂǁůƐ P 
dĂůŝƐƐĞ ĨŝůƚĞƌƐ ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ZĂǁůƐ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ŝŐŶŽƌŝŶŐ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůǇ
richer, principle of growth. Instead of an overlapping consensus between 
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otherwise divergent worldviews, the ethical principle of growth recommends 
that individuals and groups cultivate those experiences that will liberate their 
potentialities.30 
 
If to Talisse this principle of growth is overly constraining, Ralston explains that it is 
nothing more than a principle ŽĨƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ  “ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ
ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ĂĚĞƉƚ Ăƚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĂŶĚ ŐƌŽƵƉ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ?31 by developing 
their capacities for problem solving  W whatever they may be. In other words, Deweyan 
democracy is, at its heart, an injunction to become better problem solvers. The only 
clear specifications made by Dewey about how we might go about following such an 
injunction consist in pointing out that education (in the widest sense of the word) and 
the actual practice of collective problem solving are good places to start. On this 
reading, the outcomes of the process of problem solving are left undetermined by 
Dewey. Or, as Matthew Festenstein puts it: 
The precise form in which this ideal is to take political shape is up to the 
individuals themselves, in the specific circumstances in which they live. Dewey is 
explicitly agnostic about the forms which the ideal might take: what is ultimately 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉƵďůŝĐŝƐ ‘ĂŬŝŶĚŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞǁŚŝĐŚ
does not yet exŝƐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ŝŶŝƚƐĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ? ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞŚĞŝŐŚƚŽĨĂďƐƵƌĚŝƚǇƚŽƚƌǇ
to tell you what it would be like if it existed ?32.33   
 
To underline the open-ended nature of his ideal, Dewey further writes that 
 “ ?Ě ?emocracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any 
special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they 
ĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĞŶƌŝĐŚĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?34   
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Ralston explains that this seems a far cry from advancing a state-sponsored 
ǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ ? “ ?ŝ ?nstead, it is merely to restate the fact that humans are naturally problem-
solvers; to observe that humans who are citizens of democracies confront common 
problems; and then to infer from the fact and observation that the challenge for 
democratic citizens is to become better collaborative problem-ƐŽůǀĞƌƐ ? ?35 Ralston adds 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ? ZĂǁůƐ ? ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ăůů ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞ ŵĂĚĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
language of (or in a language translatable into) public reason is far more stringent than 
ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ  “ĨĂŝƌ ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ  ? Q ? ƉĞƌŵŝƚ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĂŐĞŶƚƐ  ? Q ? ƚŽ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƌĞƐŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?36 
Ralston goes on to articulate what he sees as ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨ
ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ZĂůƐƚŽŶ ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǁĞǇ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ƚǁŽ ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ P  “ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ
ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƚŽƚŚĞƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŚĞůĚŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶďǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ? Q ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ
question concerns whether groups are open to rĞĂĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇƐŽĨĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŶŐ ? ?37 
Thus, for Dewey, the process of problem solving necessarily involves two steps: first, the 
individuals who form part of a group must identify shared interests; and, second, they 
ŵƵƐƚ  “ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞŶŽǀĞůĂŶĚ ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ǁĂǇƐof associating in order to address their shared 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?38 Deweyan democracy thus only demands that citizens be prepared to revise 
the forms of association in which they participate for the sake of finding improved forms 
of communal living. Thus Ralston wƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĨŽƌĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽĨ
ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ĐĂůůĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵƵƚƵĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝǀĞ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ
ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ? ? ?39 This, Ralston claims, is a method for resolving social problems, not a 
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 “ƐƚĂƚĞ-sponsored worldview  W a procedure for negotiating, though not permanently 
resolving, the deeply divisive and sometimes intractable differences between peoples 
ĂŶĚŐƌŽƵƉƐďĞŚŽůĚĞŶƚŽĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐĨŽƌŵƐŽĨůŝĨĞ ? ?40  
Dewey does indeed offer his own pluralist procedure for addressing the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. Moreover, I agree that Deweyan democracy is a method for 
solving social problems, not a comprehensive conception of the good with the ambition 
of taking control of the state apparatus. Ralston therefore understandably rejects the 
approach of interpreting Dewey through a Rawlsian filter. Although I appreciate the 
force of this move ?dĂůŝƐƐĞ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ, rightly or wrongly, that pragmatism make 
itself more  ‘pragmatically ? relevant by dialogically engaging with contemporary 
arguments in political philosophy. In order to respond to Talisse on his own term, and 
hopefully convince him of the error of his ways, it behooves us Deweyan democrats to 
thoroughly consider Deweyan democracy through the Rawlsian filter. My contention is 
that, even from this perspective, Deweyan democracy meets the challenge posed by the 
fact of reasonable pluralism, since it relies on a thin and not a full conception of the 
good.  
 
III. Rawls Revisited: Deweyan Democracy as Political Liberalism 
 
In both a Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, Rawls relies on a distinction between 
 ‘ĨƵůů ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ ?  ‘&Ƶůů ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚ ŝŶ ĨƵůůǇǁŽƌŬĞĚ
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out accounts of conceptions ŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚůŝĨĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞ ‘ƚŚŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶ
accounts of what moral agents minimally require in order to realise full conceptions of 
ƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ ?Kƌ ?ĂƐ^ĂŵƵĞů&ƌĞĞŵĂŶƉƵƚƐŝƚ ?ĂĨƵůůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ “ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂ
of final ends tŚĂƚĂƌĞǁŽƌƚŚƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƐĂŬĞ ? ?41 while a thin theory of the 
ŐŽŽĚ  “ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐĞƚ ĨŽƌƚŚĂŶǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĞŶĚƐĂƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƐĂŬĞ ? ?42 
dŚƵƐ ?ĂĨƵůůƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ P “tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŐŽĂůŽĨ
human lifĞ ? ? ?ǁŚŝůĞĂƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ P “tŚĂƚĞŶĚƐŝƐŝƚ
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌǁŚĂƚǁĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŐŽĂůŽĨŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞ ? ? 
According to Rawls, a political conception of justice comprises a thin conception 
of the good but stops short of embracing any full theory of the good, since such full 
theories of the good are not appropriate objects for an overlapping consensus among 
reasonable citizens under the conditions of reasonable pluralism. Nevertheless, Samuel 
Freeman explains:  
Ɛ ZĂǁůƐ ƵƐĞƐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ  ‘ƐƵƉƌĞŵĞůǇƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝǀĞ ? Žƌ
 ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ?ĂŶĚŽĨ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚŽƌĚĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďĞŝŶŐĨŝŶĂůĞ ĚƐ ?ƉƵƌƐƵĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ
own sake. For example, our interest in self-ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?
according to Hobbes, but that does not mean that self-preservation is one of the 
final ends we pursue and which give our lives meaning. It means rather that it is 
an essential interest that must be fulfilled if any of our final ends and pursuits 
are to be realized. It is in this sense that it is an essential good.43  
 
Thus, one might say that ZĂǁůƐ ?ƚŚŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ points to goods that are of 
the highest value, without seeking to articulate any final moral good (summum bonum). 
That is to say, thin theories of the good identify goods that are of the highest value in 
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the same sense that Rawls ƐƉĞĂŬƐ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ŽƌĚĞƌ ?44, 
they are worthy of pursuit whatever other goals we may hold.  
In order for Talisse to have shown that Deweyan democracy is reasonably 
rejectable and that it therefore fails to countenance the fact of reasonable pluralism, he 
needs to have shown that Deweyan democracy is irrevocably wedded to a full and not a 
thin conception of the good.45 I contend that he fails to do so and that a more accurate 
interpretation of Deweyan democracy will demonstrate that it only requires a thin 
theory of the good that identifies goods ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘higheƐƚǀĂůƵĞ ? in the Rawlsian sense. As 
mentioned previously, Deweyan democracy is wedded to a specific conception of the 
ŐŽŽĚĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?Once the distinction between thin and full conceptions of the good 
is established, all I need to show is that growth is a thin not a full conception of the 
good. In other words, I need to show that growth establishes general ends that are 
rational to pursue no matter what our more specific life goals might be and remains 
largely agnostic about what final or ultimate life goals we ought to adopt. If I can show 
this, it then follows that Deweyan democracy is capable of countenancing the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. But to do this, I need to explain precisely what Deweyan growth 
involves.  
According to James S. Johnston, Deweyan growth has three broad meanings: 
firstly, growth is the continued life and development of a biological organism; secondly, 
growth is the capacity to make intelligent judgments; thirdly, growth is the capacity to 
develop intelligent habits of action by learning from past experiences and judgments 
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and adapting ensuing actions in light of such a process of learning.46 This means that 
 ‘growth ? ŝƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞƌǀĞ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ
general capacity to solve problems. In other words, the development of capacities that 
enable intelligent problem solving ought to be understood as being of primarily 
instrumental value, since they are of ultimate value in their enabling the solving of 
problems.  
This last sentence, however, might seem rather contentious even to the most 
ardent Deweyan. Why? Because Dewey offered a rather complex account of the 
relationship between means and ends. Indeed, he does not draw a staunch ontological 
separation between the two, claiming that  “ŵĞĂŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĞŶĚƐ ĂƌĞ ƚǁŽ ŶĂŵĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
same reality. ?47 Yet, this is not to say we cannot distinguish means from ends. Rather, as 
Naoko Saito puts it: 
/ŶĞǁĞǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵĞĂŶƐĂŶĚĞŶĚƐŝƐŶŽƚŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ?ďut 
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ?  ? Q ? ŶĚƐ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ Ă ŵĞĂŶƐ ďǇ ƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĨƌŽŵ
which we anticipate the next act. In turn, a means is the name for the next 
immediate action to be taken as temporary end.48  ‘DĞĂŶƐĂƌĞŵĞĂŶƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ
intermediates, middle termƐ ?.49 Ends are being reconstructed at each moment 
ŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ŶĚƐŐƌŽǁ ? ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƐƚĂƚŝĐƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ ‘ůŽĐĂƚĞĚĂƚŽŶĞ
ƉůĂĐĞ ŽŶůǇ ?50. ZĂƚŚĞƌ ? ĞŶĚƐ ĂƌĞ  ‘ĞŶĚƐ-in-ǀŝĞǁ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ƐĞƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ
acts51:   ‘ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞǁŚĞŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ? Q ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂŶĞŶĚ-in-view, an 
Ăŝŵ ?ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ĂƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƵƐĂďůĞĂƐĂƉůĂŶ ŝŶ ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?52. 
 ? Q ?dŚƵƐ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŝĐĂůůǇ ‘ ?Ğ ?ŶĚƐĂƌĞůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇĞŶĚůĞƐƐ ?53; ends are open-ĞŶĚĞĚ ? ? Q ?
ƐĞǁĞǇƐĂǇƐ ? ‘ƚƌĂǀĞůůŝng is a cŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐ ?54.55 
 
Moreover, sŝŶĐĞĞǁĞǇƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶĞƐƐŽĨ ?ĂŶ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚ
defines [said activity]; the definition comes from the structure and function of subject-
ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?56, it is this same functional definition that I draw upon to argue that we ought 
to understand the capacities for intelligent problem solving as being primarily of 
Forthcoming in the Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 18 
instrumental value rather than consummatory. In other words, I contend that we must 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ‘ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? not in relation to its consummatory character (i.e. the satisfaction 
we derive from developing our capacities to solve problems), but its functional or 
instrumental capacity to help in the task of solving problems intelligently.  
Yet, here already the critic beckons: What exactly ŝƐ ŵĞĂŶƚ ďǇ  ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ?
problem solving? The intelligent character of problem solving consists in solving present 
problems in a manner that enables, or at the very least does not impede, future 
problem solving. Thus, the function of growth on this account is to enable us to develop 
capacities that not only solve existing problems but that put us in good stead to solve 
both present and future ones. The upshot of this is that growth cannot point to an 
ethical finality because  “ ?ƚ ?ŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌƵĞŐŽŽĚĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ďĞ ĚŽŶĞ ŽŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ Ăůů  ? Q ? /ƚ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ĚŽŶĞ ? ĂŶĚ ĚŽŶĞ ŽǀĞƌ ĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ ĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ
ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌŝƐĞ ?57. Thus, on this 
account, the process of growth is never fully completed, because it is the nature of the 
human condition to always encounter new problems. This means that the concrete 
goals that growth enables us to further are unspecifiable in advance. All Deweyan 
growth requires of us is that we pursue the development of the habits of action that 
enable the process of intelligent problem solving, while seeking to avoid those habits 
that would hinder it. As mentioned previously, Dewey remains largely philosophically 
agnostic about particular solutions to particular problems. In fact, the Deweyan account 
is even agnostic about tŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇŽƌƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? /ƚ ŝƐ
ĂůƐŽĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŽŶĞƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ
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we cannot improve) to any one problem. It allows such specifications to be made a 
posteriori, leaving it to actual inquirers to ascertain, since it is the iterated process of 
inquiry  W and it alone  W which ultimately establishes whether or not a solution to a 
particular problem can be intelligently improved upon.  
Therefore, at a general level, Deweyan growth enables us to ascertain that 
certain habits of thought and action are to be preferred to others for the sake of 
intelligent problem solving. That is to say, for example, that the general goal of problem 
solving informs us that truth-telling is preferable to lying, that logical thinking is 
preferable to wishful thinking, that conscious decision-making is preferable to knee-jerk 
reaction, etc. Growth therefore does not consist in the furthering of pre-established 
ends or life goals; it consists in the development of certain capacities that it is rational to 
want to possess given the fact that intelligently solving problems is necessary, whatever 
other ultimate goals groups or agents may wish to pursue. Therefore, Deweyan 
democrats must hold that intelligent ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘highest-ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
same sense that  W to summon FreemaŶ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ W “ŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƐĞůĨ-preservation is of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? Q ? but that does not mean that self-preservation is one of the final 
ends we pursue and which give our lives meaning. It means rather that it is an essential 
interest that must be fulfilled if any of our final ends and pursuits are to be realized ? ?58 
But the critic may well further ĂƐŬ P ŽĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ŽĨ ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ
problems covertly reintroduce a contentious prescriptive normative agenda? In other 
words, the critic may well worry that, despite my claims to the contrary, intelligent 
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problem solving actually reflects a substantive political project aiming at the 
development of a reasonably rejectable conception of the good. That would mean that 
growth secretly aims towards a good beyond itself. However, if we were to ask Dewey, 
 “tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŐŽĂůŽĨŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?/ƚŚŝŶŬĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĂƚ  “Őrowth 
aims towards growth itself ?  W meaning that growth aims towards a greater development 
of our capacities to intelligently solve problems. I therefore think we should follow 
Ralston in understanding that ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ  “Ăŝŵ Ăƚ ƐŽŵĞ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ĞŶĚ ?59 beyond 
itself; agents may well pursue further ends beyond growth, but growth is not in the 
business of identifying what such eventual ends ought to be. Rather, as Welchman puts 
it: 
The putative end of human action, the good life [that is, a life of growth], cannot 
be conceived of as a discrete thing, event, quality, or state. It must be instead 
conceived of as a series, a series of challenges overcome giving rise to new 
challenges. Each new end is a new construction, the outcome of a process of 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
circumstances, subject to eventual confirmation.60 
 
The most demanding prescription we can derive from Deweyan growth, I contend, 
involves a commitment to the pursuit of what Axel Honneth calls an  “ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞŐŽŽĚ ?61 
ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞ “ĨŽƌĞƐĞĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŝŶƐƵĐŚĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚǁĞĨŽƌŵĞŶĚƐǁŚŝĐŚ
ŐƌŽǁŝŶƚŽŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĂŶĚƌĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?62. On my account, this means that a 
solution to a problem is  ‘intelligent ? if and only if that solution both resolves the 
problem at hand by the lights of those who experience it and does not inhibit future 
problem solving. My contention is that all reasonable problem solvers (including Talisse) 
would agree to this constraint, upon reflection. 
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 Thus, if we now return to the Rawlsian conceptual apparatus, it should be clear 
that growth is a thin conception of the good precisely because it radically under-
determines which ultimate ends citizens may wish to pursue. To put it another way: 
under conditions of reasonable pluralism, in order for Deweyan democracy to be 
reasonably rejectable, reasonable citizens would have to reject the idea that the 
capacities that further intelligent problem solving are an essential good, worthy of 
pursuit no matter what ultimate life goals they hold. Yet, reasonable citizens, in virtue of 
their very reasonableness, would not reject such an idea. Recall that for Rawls, the 
object of an overlapping consensus merely requires that all reasonable citizens value a 
common value, without requiring that they value said value for the same reasons (since 
those reasons can be derived from their respective comprehensive doctrines). My 
contention is that growth, and thus Deweyan democracy, requires that all reasonable 
citizens value intelligently solving problems, not that they all value intelligent problem 
solving for the same reasons. Therefore, if all reasonable citizens value intelligent 
problem solving, Deweyan democracy can be the object of reasonable agreement under 
conditions of reasonable pluralism. 
In summary, although Deweyan democracy relies on a particular conception of 
the good (namely, growth), it fails to be reasonably rejectable on the Rawlsian account 
because growth is a thin and not a full theory of the good. Thus, it only calls for the 
development of capacities that enable continuous intelligent problem solving. Such a 
goal is of the highest order only in the sense that it is necessary (in a manner analogous 
to continued existence) for the furthering of any other human goals. This is consistent 
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with ZĂǁůƐ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƐ (which are legitimately used to 
publically justify) within conditions of reasonable pluralism. It therefore follows that 
Deweyan democracy does not fail to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 
IV. Some Potential Talissean Replies 
In response to this argument, I believe that Talisse could emit the following replies: (i) 
Deweyan growth simply is a perfectionist theory of the good and it is thus reasonably 
rejectable; (ii) Deweyan growth is reasonably rejectable because it identifies shared 
experience as the ultimate moral good; and (iii) any version of Deweyan democracy 
which is not reasonably rejectable fails to be appropriately Deweyan. 
 
(i) The Problem of Perfectionism  ? Growth as a Teleology Without an End 
One might worry that Talisse would lend little credence to my argument so far because, 
on his understanding, Deweyan growth simply is a perfectionist conception of human 
flourishing and as such it is reasonably rejectable. Now, there are two obvious senses of 
 ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? ǁĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ P  ?Ă ? ZĂǁůƐ ? ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ  ?ď ? Ă ŵŽƌĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů
understanding of the concept. Let us consider these in turn. 
  ?Ă ? ZĂǁůƐ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ Ă ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ĂŶĚ ĞĐĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? ? 
/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽŚŝŵ ?ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŝŶƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĂĚƵƚǇ  “ƚŽ
develop human persons of a certain style and aesthetic grace, and to advance the 
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ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ ŽĨ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚƐ ? ?63  Or as Freeman puts it, 
perfectioŶŝƐŵ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŝŶ  “ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŽĨ
perfection, and maintain that the achievement of human excellences in art, science and 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŐŽŽĚ ? ?64 ZĂǁůƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐ “a 
teleological theory directing society to arrange institutions and to define the duties and 
obligations of individuals so as to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, 
science, and culture. The principle obviously is more demanding the higher the relevant 
ŝĚĞĂůŝƐƉŝƚĐŚĞĚ ? ?65 According to Rawls, perfectionism cannot form the basis of a political 
conception of justice because we cannot expect reasonable citizens to agree upon what 
constitutes human perfection: perfectionist ethical ideals are, by definition, full and not 
thin. 
/ ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ĨĂŝůƐ ƚŽ Ĩŝƚ ZĂǁůƐ ? ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
perfectionism. Although Dewey is committed to the idea that his conception of growth 
can direct social institutions and define duties and obligations while also requiring the 
development of human capacities in the arts, science, and culture, it is not perfectionist 
because such development does not constitute human flourishing per se; it merely 
enables it, since human flourishing is ultimately constituted by developing the capacities 
for intelligent problem solving. To ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ P ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨƵůĨŝůZĂǁůƐ ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
perfectionism, Deweyan growth must maintain that the achievement of human 
excellences in art, science, and culture constitutes the human good. Thus, in order for an 
ethical theory to be perfectionist in these terms, it must maintain that such human 
excellences constitute the human good. This is a sufficiency claim: it means that on 
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ZĂǁůƐ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ Ă ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶg is subsumed by the 
development of discrete human excellences in the arts, sciences, and culture. I contend 
ƚŚĂƚ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ďĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ĨŽƌ
Dewey, such developments are always seen as being of value because they enable 
future problem solving. To put it otherwise, although Dewey was one to encourage the 
development of human capacities in art, science, and culture and although his 
conception of growth demands that these capacities be furthered, Dewey does not hold 
the view that the human good is subsumed by the achievement of human excellence in 
art, science, and culture. Ultimately, in my view, what constitutes or subsumes the 
human good for Dewey is a capacity to resolve problems intelligently: the fact that 
developing human capacities in the arts, science, and culture is a necessary part of 
developing human capacities to solve problems intelligently is entirely incidental. 
Therefore, growth is not a perfectionist ethical ideal as specified by Rawls because it 
does not value the development of a pre-given list of cultural excellences for its own 
sake; rather it only values them in so far as they enable the development of capacities 
for intelligent problem solving. Yet, Talisse may well intend to associate Deweyan 
growth with a wider notion of perfectionism. 
(b) A more commonly held view of ethical perfectionism consists in the belief 
that the realisation of human capacities, broadly construed, constitutes human 
flourishing  W not achieving human excellence in specifically cultural terms.66 And this 
may seem more problematic for my argument, as Deweyan growth certainly requires 
the development of human capacities. However, it is still the case that for Dewey, the 
Forthcoming in the Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 25 
development of human capacities and the fostering of certain types of human 
relationships are, functionally, primarily necessary means for resolving problems. They 
do not, in and of themselves, constitute the human good in any other sense than that 
they are themselves solutions to existing problems. On this instrumentalist account of 
Deweyan democracy, capacities are valuable only insofar as they resolve existing 
problems and/or enable solving future problems. To speak somewhat oxymoronically, 
growth can be understood as a teleology without an end  W it affirms the need for 
humans to develop in certain ways in order to become judicious problem solvers, but it 
does not specify to what end this process ought to drive other than the preservation 
and expansion of the process of becoming more capable and judicious problem solvers 
itself. It is thus teleological only in that it points to the development of certain 
capacities, but not truly teleological in that it eschews providing a telos, a final endpoint 
towards which this development is ultimately supposed to drive. Campbell claims that 
when Dewey writes,  
[g]rowth ŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇŵŽƌĂů ‘ĞŶĚ ? ? ?Ś ?ĞŝƐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĞŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
sense:  ‘dŚĞĞŶĚŝƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂƚĞƌŵŝŶƵƐŽƌĂůŝŵŝƚƚŽďĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞ
process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but 
the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining, is the aim in 
ůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?67  ? Q ? ?' ?ƌŽǁƚŚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŝŶŐŽĨůŝĨĞĂĨƚĞƌƐŽŵĞ ‘Ɖƌ ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚĨŝǆĞĚ
ƐĐŚĞŵĂŽƌŽƵƚůŝŶĞ ?ŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŽďĞĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?68  ‘EŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽƌŐƌŽƵƉǁŝůůďĞ
judged by whether they come up to or fall short of some fixed result, but by the 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐ ? ?69 DŽƌĂůŐƌŽǁƚŚ ‘ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
ƚŽĂĐƚƐŽĂƐƚŽĨŝůůƵƉƐŽŵĞƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚŝĚĞĂůƐĞůĨ ?70.71 
 
Writing more generally, Philip Kitcher addresses the worry that this notion of pragmatic 
progress might  “eschew  ? Q ? teleology at the front door ? while letting  “ŝƚƐŶĞĂŬŝŶĂŐĂŝŶ
through the rear, ? 72 by asking:  “Can we make sense of the notion of a situation as 
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problematic, without presupposing a goal? After all, to speak of a problem is to 
recognize a goal, to wit relief from the source of the trouble ? ?73 In the last analysis, the 
reply proposed by Kitcher, consists in insisting on the absence of a fixed or pre-given 
wished for final goal:  
dŚĞ ĂůůĞŐĞĚ  ‘ŐŽĂů ? is local, something that could well cover any number of 
incompatible  alternatives, unranked from the present perspective. Once the 
goal has been achieved  W relief obtained  W people will move on to address other 
difficulties, including, perhaps,  problems generated by the solution itself. There 
is no envisaged final state, but an unpredictable sequence of local adaptations.74 
 
Thus, growth does not require valuing the development of capacities either for its own 
sake or for the sake of achieving some ultimate finality (telos). Growth aims for the 
development of the methods of intelligent problem solving for the sake of intelligently 
solving problems. Intelligently solving problems, I maintain, is a goal which reasonable 
citizens would agree to upon reflection. Or to put it in Rawlsian language, the 
development of capacities for intelligent problem solving constitutes a thin conception 
of the good required for  W not an impediment to  W the pursuit of reasonable full 
conceptions of the good. 
 
(ii) The Problem of Shared Experience  ?  Associated Living as a Democratic Means  
At the beginning of this article, I ventured that Talisse found two theses associated with 
Deweyan democracy particularly problematic, namely, ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ dŚĞƐŝƐ ?  ? ? ? ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ  ‘WĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚdŚĞƐŝƐ ?  ? ? ? ?ƵƚƚĞǆƚƵĂů evidence also suggests that Talisse might find 
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ƚŚĞ ‘tĂǇŽĨ>ŝĨĞdŚĞƐŝƐ ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐŝŶŝƚƐŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚ ?dŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ
that democracy is not simply a kind of state or a mode of government, but a way of life. 
In other words, what Talisse might take to be reasonably rejectable about Deweyan 
democracy is that it is committed to a conception of growth that identifies  ‘shared 
experience ? ?ŽƌĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚůŝǀŝŶŐ ? as the ultimate moral goal. Indeed, when Talisse goes 
on to present his positive account of Peircean democracy, he writes:  
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞ ?ǁŝƚŚĞǁĞǇ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŽĨ
ŚƵŵĂŶŐŽŽĚƐ ?75 is to take it to be true that shared experience is the greatest of 
human goods, and to take this to be true is to be committed to the idea that the 
best reasons, arguments and evidence would confirm it.76  
  
I think we can thus understand Talisse to be committed to the view that Deweyan 
democracy is reasonably rejectable because it is committed to a conception of growth 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŵŽƌĂůŐŽĂů ? 
However, I think this also is a mistaken understanding of Deweyan democracy. 
dŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵ ?ůĞƚƵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĞǁĞǇ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐĐŝƚĞĚďǇ
Talisse first appear. In the relevant passage in Experience and Nature, Dewey writes: 
Communication is consummatory as well as instrumental. It is a means of 
establishing cooperation, domination and order. Shared experience is the 
greatest of human goods. In communication, such conjunction and contact as is 
characteristic of animals become endearments capable of infinite idealization; 
they become symbols of the very culŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?   ? Q ? /Ĩ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
discourse is instrumental in function, it also is capable of becoming an enjoyed 
object to those concerned in it. Upon the whole, human history shows that 
thinking in being abstract, remote and technical has been laborious; or at least 
that the process of attaining such thinking has been rendered painful to most by 
social circumstances. In view of the importance of such activity and its objects, it 
is a priceless gain when it becomes an intrinsic delight. Few would philosophize 
if philosophic discourse did not have its own inhering fascination. Yet it is not 
the satisfactoriness of the activity which defines science or philosophy; the 
definition comes from the structure and function of subject-matter. To say that 
knowledge as the fruit of intellectual discourse is an end in itself is to say what is 
esthetically and morally true for some persons, but it conveys nothing about the 
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structure of knowledge; and it does not even hint that its objects are not 
instrumental.77  
 
Here, Dewey explains that scientific and philosophic discourses can be experienced as 
ends in themselves but are functionally instruments that help in attaining further goods. 
Philosophy and science may provide a certain enjoyment (that is their consummatory 
character), but it is their instrumental capacity to help in responding to problems that 
provide their functional definition.  
 On my account, the Deweyan democrat ultimately ought to understand shared 
experiences in the same way that Dewey values artistic and scientific capacities: namely, 
shared experiences are functionally defined by their instrumental capacity to further 
intelligent problem solving. Shared experience, according to Dewey, is what enables us 
to assess which habits of thought and action are more fertile than others because it 
enables communication, critique and learning.78 Yet, shared experience is not itself the 
goal of rightful action. As we have seen, intelligent problem solving is the goal of rightful 
action. Shared experience happens to be a necessary condition for the process of 
valuation, judgment and learning that enables intelligent problem solving. Thus, in 
response to Talisse, we should understand the valƵĞŽĨ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? as primarily 
instrumental, since particular types of shared experiences will enable the development 
of intelligent problem solving better than others. 
 Thus, on this account, ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ Žƌ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ
experience are the ultimate moral goods come down to claiming ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞ ĞǀĞƌ-
ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?ŵĂƚƵƌŝŶŐ ? ƌĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ?ŽƵƌŐŽĂůƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ
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value (i.e. one without which valuing other values is impossible) in human life. 
Consequently, the only general injunction we can derive from Deweyan growth is to 
develop our capacities for intelligent problem solving for the sake of solving problems 
intelligently. This is reminiscent of the sentiment found in the phrase Peirce thought 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ŽŶ ĞǀĞƌǇ ǁĂůů ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ P  “Ž ŶŽƚ ďůŽck the way of 
inquiry ?.79 Moreover, it is a far cry from claiming to have solved the problem of 
establishing what lies at the end of that path. And yet, Talisse needed to show that 
growth requires that all reasonable citizens share a common belief in a singular 
controversial endpoint of human flourishing. Short of such a point of fracture amongst 
reasonable citizens, Talisse cannot show Deweyan democracy to be anything more than 
a democratic ideal resting on a thin theory of the good. 
 
(iii) Hollowing Out Deweyan Democracy  ? Hypotheses and Translatability 
/Ŷ ŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ůŝǌĂďĞƚŚ ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁƐ ? dĂůŝƐƐĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ
versions of Deweyan democracy that reduce ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ conception of growth to 
intelligent problem solving fail to ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇĞǁĞǇĂŶĂďŽƵƚĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ
democratic ideal. He writes: 
WĞƌŚĂƉƐŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĞǁĞǇĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇŝƐĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂŶ/ŚĂǀĞ 
 allowed. She may say that she claims only that democratic communities should address 
 their social problems by pooling information and other cognitive resources from 
 their diverse citizenry in a way that gives a proper hearing and full consideration to all 
 points of view, with the expectation that all collective decisions are but provisional 
 stopping points in a continuous process  of self-correction. Again, this view is compelling. 
 But is it distinctively Deweyan?  There is nothing here that Madison, Mill, Popper or 
 even Russell would have rejected; furthermore, Cass Sunstein 80  endorses 
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 precisely this picture, and although he sometimes refers approvingly to Dewey, he is not 
 Ă ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚ ? ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞǁĞǇĂŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ
 is not distinctively Deweyan. Can pragmatism offer no distinctive and viable political 
 theory?81 
 
In other words, Talisse argues that understanding growth as the mere pursuit of ever 
more intelligent methods of solving problems constitutes an abandonment of the 
Deweyan project altogether. If I am to read Talisse as charitably as possible, I must take 
Talisse to understand ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ views on how to actually improve intelligent problem 
solving in concrete situations (ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ accounts of progressive education, 
community formation, or democratic industrial relations) to truly constitute Deweyan 
democracy and to hold that those views are reasonably rejectable. 
Therefore, to support my argument to the effect that Deweyan democracy 
essentially consists in intelligent problem solving, I need to account for the more 
particular and controversial claims about democracy occasionally made by Dewey. In 
short, I think these views are best understood as hypotheses that seek to respond to 
concrete problems, as attempts at participating in situated intelligent problem solving. 
To put it in DĞǁĞǇĂŶƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂŝŵƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞ ‘ĞŶĚƐŝŶǀŝĞǁ ? ?Therefore, I do not take 
them to constitute ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝĚĞĂů. Instead, I think Deweyan democracy 
consists in the wider process of intelligent problem solving itself. Why do I believe this? 
Because the more particular views expressed by Dewey that Talisse points to as being 
reasonably rejectable are no more constitutive of Deweyan democracy than Dŝůů ?Ɛ
proposals in favour of public and weighted voting constitute Dŝůů ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝĚĞĂů. In 
both cases, we can distinguish the concrete proposals, attempts at offering actionable 
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social or political advice, from a broader ideal. Instead of this broadness being 
problematic, I contend that it suggests that Deweyan democracy is, at least in principle, 
capable (as much as any other conception of democracy) of being politically neutral in 
the manner required by ZĂǁůƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨpolitical liberalism. 
Yet, even if one wanted to reject my reading of Dewey and root Deweyan 
democracy in his more controversial views (which I have argued are situated hypotheses 
for action) this may not be as problematic as Talisse thinks it to be. Why? Because on 
ZĂǁůƐ ?ĨŝŶĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐƚŚŝƐimportant proviso:  
Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in 
public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political 
reasons  W and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines  W are presented that 
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support political arguments made in the language of sectarian doctrines (such as those 
offered by religious or philosophical views) are permissible so long as they are 
translatable into public  reasons.82  
 
Leif Wenar explains this point further thusly:  
So President Lincoln, for instance, could legitimately condemn the evil of slavery using 
Biblical imagery, since his pronouncements could have been expressed in terms of the 
public values of freedom and equality. Thus even within its limited range of application, 
Rawls's doctrine of public reason is rather permissive concerning what citizens may say 
and do within the bounds of civility.83 
  
This means that on the Rawlsian view, even ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ 
would be permissible in public debate so long as they can be translated into the 
language of public reason, which understands citizens as free and equal people seeking 
to live under a stably ordered political order. In other words, the controversial individual 
views ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƐon democracy do not have to be 
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abandoned just because they are reasonably rejectable. They merely need to be 
translatable into the more general language of public reason to be receivable in public 
discourse. Ultimately, in order for Talisse to have truly shown that even the most 
controversial views he associates with Deweyan democracy have no place in civic 
discourse, he needs to have shown that no such translation can be carried out. He has 
not yet done so and the burden of proof continues to lay with him. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, /ŚĂǀĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚdĂůŝƐƐĞ ?Ɛargument according to which Deweyan democracy is 
reasonably rejectable, because it relies on a controversial conception of the good that 
could not be the object of reasonable agreement under conditions of reasonable 
pluralism ?/ƚŚĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ^ŚĂŶĞZĂůƐƚŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚdĂůŝƐƐĞƵŶĨĂŝƌůǇ
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƐ ĞǁĞǇ ?Ɛ ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐƚ ĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă ĞƌůŝŶŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ Ă ZĂǁůƐŝĂŶ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
filter. I then went on to argue that, even if we accept the Rawlsian challenge, then we 
ought to evaluate Deweyan democracy from within the wider Rawlsian framework. 
Furthermore, I argued that from within this framework, in order to show that Deweyan 
democracy fails to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism, Talisse needed to 
have shown that it is committed to a full (as opposed to thin) theory of the good. 
However, I have shown that Deweyan growth is, in fact, a thin conception of the good 
merely committed to the goal of intelligent problem solving. Since all reasonable 
citizens can reasonably be expected to be committed to the goal of intelligent problem 
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solving, Deweyan democracy can thus be the object of reasonable agreement within 
circumstances of reasonable pluralism. I then considered three potential replies: (i) 
Deweyan growth is a perfectionist ethical ideal; (ii) Deweyan democracy demands that 
we value shared experience; (iii) in order for Deweyan democracy to remain Deweyan it 
must be committed to controversial views and is thus unfit for public discussion. In 
response, I argued that growth is not a perfectionist ethical ideal  W neither as Rawls 
understands it nor under a broader conception of perfectionism. I then argued that 
Deweyan growth merely requires that we value shared experience in so far as it enables 
intelligent problem solving. Furthermore, I argued that Deweyan democracy properly 
understood does not rely on controversial theses, but only relies on a thin theory of the 
good that can plausibly be the object of agreement among reasonable citizens under 
circumstances of reasonable pluralism. Finally, I argued that ĞǁĞǇ ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝĚĞĂůŝƐ
distinguishable from more concrete positions he has adopted with reference to his ideal 
and that, on the Rawlsian account, other more controversial views one might associate 
with Deweyan democracy only need to be translatable into the language of public 
reason to be permissible within public discourse. Understood within this wider Rawlsian 
framework, I have shown that Deweyan democracy is not reasonably rejectable. 
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